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Abad Elfgeeh, Defendant-Appellant.[*]
No. 08-5500-cr.United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
May 18, 2010.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Johnson, J.).
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York be AFFIRMED.
James M. Branden, New York, NY, for Appellant.
Jeffrey H. Knox, Assistant United States Attorney (David C. James, Pamela K. Chen, on the brief), for Benton J. Campbell, United States Attorney for the Eastern District of New York, Brooklyn, NY, for Appellee.
PRESENT: AMALYA L. KEARSE, RICHARD C. WESLEY, Circuit Judges and PAUL A. CROTTY, District Judge.[**]
SUMMARY ORDER
Appellant, Abad Elfgeeh, appeals from an amended judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Johnson, J.), entered on November 10, 2008. Defendant was convicted, after a jury trial, of conspiracy to operate an unlicensed money-transmitting business in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, operation of an unlicensed money-transmitting business in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1960(a), and structuring of financial transactions in violation of 31 U.S.C. § 5324(a)(3). In a prior appeal, this Court affirmed Elfgeeh’s conviction and sentence in substantial part, but remanded for reconsideration of a previously imposed fine United States v. Elfgeeh, 515 F.3d 100, 136-37, 140
(2d Cir. 2008). On remand, the district court rescinded the fine. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying
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facts, the procedural history, and the issues presented for review.
In his second appeal to this Court Elfgeeh contends that the district court erred in declining to resentence him de novo and in refusing to redact a paragraph of his presentence report (“PSR”), which he claims causes him to be treated in an unduly harsh manner by the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”).[1] We conclude that this Court’s limited remand[2] did not call for de novo resentencing. We further hold that, based on the record before us, we cannot find that the defendant has been harmed by the contents of his PSR within the meaning of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(d)(3)(C). If the defendant has a remedy to challenge restrictions imposed by the BOP, it lies with that entity.
This Court has already specifically rejected defendant’s argument that his sentence was “substantively unreasonable or unwarrantedly high in comparison to the terms of imprisonment meted out to others convicted of similar crimes.”Elfgeeh, 515 F.3d at 139. We noted that the sentence is within the appropriate Guidelines range and found “no basis for concluding that the prison terms imposed are unreasonable, given that the district court’s articulation of the reasons for the prison term[] imposed, although not extensive[,] . . . was sufficient to show that the court considered the Guidelines and the required § 3553 factors.” Id.
Because this Court identified only a “sentencing error” with respect to the fine imposed, and not a “conviction error,” resentencing de novo was not appropriate. United States v. Rigas, 583 F.3d 108, 116 (2d Cir. 2009); see als United States v. Stanley, 54 F.3d 103, 108 (2d Cir. 1995). Nothing required the district court to go
beyond the “narrow issue” identified by this Court on the first appeal. Stanley, 54 F.3d at 108. We gave a specific instruction to the district court to address the propriety of the fine imposed on Elfgeeh, which it clearly did. Therefore, we identify no error on the part of the sentencing court in this regard.
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(d)(3)(C) states that the “presentence report must exclude” “any information that, if disclosed, might result in physical or other harm to the defendant.” Fed.R.Crim.P. 32(d)(3)(C). As an initial matter, we note that there are “no formal limitations” on the contents of a PSR. Gregg v. United States, 394 U.S. 489, 492, 89 S.Ct. 1134, 22 L.Ed.2d 442 (1969). We cannot conclude, based on the record before us, that the defendant has been harmed within the meaning of Rule 32.[3]
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To the extent Elfgeeh challenges, as unnecessary or unwarranted, restrictions imposed by the BOP, these protocols should be addressed through the channels in place at the BOP.
We have considered all of Elfgeeh’s contentions on this appeal and have found them to be without merit. Therefore, for the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is hereby AFFIRMED.