RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO SUMMARY ORDERS FILED AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 0.23 AND FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1. IN A BRIEF OR OTHER PAPER IN WHICH A LITIGANT CITES A SUMMARY ORDER, IN EACH PARAGRAPH IN WHICH A CITATION APPEARS, AT LEAST ONE CITATION MUST EITHER BE TO THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR BE ACCOMPANIED BY THE NOTATION: “(SUMMARY ORDER).” UNLESS THE SUMMARY ORDER IS AVAILABLE IN AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE WHICH IS PUBLICLY ACCESSIBLE WITHOUT PAYMENT OF FEE (SUCH AS THE DATABASE AVAILABLE AT HTTP://WWW.CA2.USCOURTS.GOV), THE PARTY CITING THE SUMMARY ORDER MUST FILE AND SERVE A COPY OF THAT SUMMARY ORDER TOGETHER WITH THE PAPER IN WHICH THE SUMMARY ORDER IS CITED. IF NO COPY IS SERVED BY REASON OF THE AVAILABILITY OF THE ORDER ON SUCH A DATABASE, THE CITATION MUST INCLUDE REFERENCE TO THAT DATABASE AND THE DOCKET NUMBER OF THE CASE IN WHICH THE ORDER WAS ENTERED. Raul AVILA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Joseph WITKOWSKI, Michael Illingworth, Defendants, Estate of Robin Kroogman, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 06-1131-cv.United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
March 2, 2007.

[EDITOR’S NOTE: This case is unpublished as indicated by the issuing court.]

Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut (Eginton, J.).

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED

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AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court be AFFIRMED.

Kim Coleman Waisonovitz, Bethany, Connecticut, for Appellant.

Michael Wolak, III, Office of Corporation Counsel, New Haven, Connecticut, for Appellee.

PRESENT: Hon. DENNIS JACOBS, Chief Judge, Hon. PIERRE N. LEVAL, Hon. SONIA SOTOMAYOR, Circuit Judges.

SUMMARY ORDER
This is an appeal from an order of the District Court for the District of Connecticut (Eginton, J.), granting summary judgment in favor of the Estate of Robin Kroogman. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history, and the issues presented for review.

A grant of summary judgment is reviewed de novo. Beth Israel Med. Ctr. v. Horizon Blue Cross and Blue Shield of New Jersey, Inc., 448 F.3d 573, 579 (2d Cir. 2006). “[S]ummary judgment is appropriate where there exists no genuine issue of material fact and, based on the undisputed facts, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted).

The district court concluded that the claim against Kroogman was barred by legislative immunity. We agree. “Local legislators, like their counterparts on the state and regional levels, are entitled to absolute immunity for their legislative activities.” Almonte v. City of Long Beach, 478 F.3d 100, 106 (2d Cir. 2007). This immunity “is not limited to the casting of a vote on a resolution or bill; it covers all aspects of the legislative process, including the discussions held . . . regarding a legislative matter in anticipation of a formal vote.” Id. The actions complained of were part of the administration of a legislative committee’s “deliberative and communicative processes.” Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen’s Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 503-04, 95 S.Ct. 1813, 44 L.Ed.2d 324
(1975) (internal quotation marks omitted).

We have considered all of Avila’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. The judgment of the district court is hereby AFFIRMED.

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