Caiyun Wang v. Holder, A096 267 343. Xiao Ping Chen, Yong Di Li v. Holder, A099 320 420, A099 320 421. Ting Yi Lin v. Holder, A075 780 271. Bi Yun Huang, aka Bi Yun Yuang, aka Vi Yun Huang v. Holder, A094 813 601. Ru Chen v. Holder, A099 927 476. Xiao Zhen Yang v. Holder, A093 408 725. Bi Hui Lin v. Holder, A094 046 300. Yun Zhi Chi v. Holder, A099 928 058. Lin Wu, Li Guang Dong v. Holder, A078 736 061, A099 930 936. Mei Ying Wu, Yong Xiu Chen v. Holder, A093 397 371, A093 397 372. Rong Bao Lu Lin Holder, A097 291 042 A099 592 334.
Nos. 07-4870-ag, 07-5589-ag, 08-1238-ag (1); 08-4314-ag (Con), 08-3715-ag (1); 09-1991-ag (Con), 08-392-ag (1); 09-2098-ag (Con), 08-4469-ag, 08-5893-ag, 09-0456-ag, 09-1661-ag, 09-2115-ag, 09-2287-ag, 09-2849-ag, 09-2939-ag, 09-2998-ag, 09-3025-ag, 09-3042-ag, 09-3329-ag, 09-3397-ag, 09-3459-ag, 09-3550-ag.United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
January 24, 2011.
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of these petitions for review of Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decisions, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED, that the petitions for review are DENIED.
Yee Ling Poon, Esq., Law Offices of Yee Ling Poon, New York, NY, for Feng Yan Chen.
Dehai Zhang Esq., Law Office of Dehai Zhang, Esq., Flushing, NY, for Mei Juan Zhang, aka Mei Juan Zheng.
Kelly J. Walls Esq., U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division, Office of, Washington, DC, for United States Department of Justice.
Richard Tarzia, Esq., The Law Office of Richard Tarzia, Belle Mead, NJ, for Wen QinOu.
Terri Leon-Benner, Esq., Washington, DC, for Holder.
Richard Tarzia Esq., The Law Office of Richard Tarzia, Belle Mead, NJ, for Han Ting Lin.
Present: DENNIS JACOBS, Chief Judge, JON O. NEWMAN, and PIERRE N. LEVAL, Circuit Judges.
Each of these petitions challenges a decision of the BIA either affirming the decision of an immigration judge (“IJ”) denying asylum and related relief or reversing the IJ’s decision granting relief. Some of the petitioners also challenge decisions of the BIA denying motions to remand or reopen. In those cases in which the BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision denying relief, we review both the IJ’s and the BIA’s opinions, see Zaman v. Mukasey, 514 F.3d 233, 237 (2d Cir. 2008), and in those cases in which the BIA reversed the IJ’s decision granting relief or denied a motion in the first instance, we review only the decision of the BIA, see Yan Chen v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 268, 271 (2d Cir. 2005). The applicable standards of review are well-established. See Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 157-58, 168-69 (2d Cir. 2008).
Petitioners, all natives and citizens of China, sought relief from removal based on their claim that they fear persecution because they have had one or more children in violation of China’s population control program. For largely the same reasons as this Court set forth in Jian Hui
Shao, 546 F.3d 138, we find no error in the agency’s decisions. See id. at 158-72. Although the petitioners in Jian Hui Shao were from Fujian Province, as are most of the petitioners here, some petitioners are from Zhejiang Province. Regardless, as with the evidence discussed in Jian Hui Shao, the evidence they have submitted relating to Zhejiang Province either does not discuss forced sterilizations or references isolated incidents of persecution of individuals who are not similarly situated to the petitioners. See id.
at 160-61, 171-72.
Some of the petitioners argue that the BIA failed to give sufficient consideration to the statement of Jin Fu Chen, who alleged that he suffered forced sterilization after his return to China based on the two children born to his wife in Japan. A prior panel of this Court has remanded a petition making a similar claim so that Jin Fu Chen’s statement (which was submitted to the BIA after a remand) could be considered by the IJ. See Zheng v. Holder, 361 Fed.Appx. 184 (2d Cir. 2010). Since the remand in Zheng, the BIA has repeatedly concluded that Jin Fu Chen’s statement does not support a claim of a well-founded fear of persecution. Accordingly, it is clear that further consideration of the statement in cases in which the IJ or the BIA failed to consider it would not change the result. See Shunfii Li v. Mukasey, 529 F.3d 141, 150 (2d Cir. 2008). Furthermore, the agency’s conclusion concerning the probative force of the statement did not involve any error of law. Additionally, contrary to one petitioner’s argument, there was no error in the agency’s decision declining to credit a similar statement from Mei Yun Chen because it was a photocopy from an unrelated case. See Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 471 F.3d 315, 342 (2d Cir. 2006).
Some of the petitioners also argue that the BIA erred by improperly conducting de novo review of determinations made by an IJ. Many of them rely on a recent decision of the Third Circuit, ruling, in the context of a claim under the Convention Against Torture, that the BIA must review
for clear error findings of fact, including predictions of future events, but may review de novo conclusions of law as to whether the facts found satisfy a particular legal standard. See Kaplun v. Attorney General, 602 F.3d 260
(3d Cir. 2010). Their claims lack merit. The BIA has not reviewed de novo any of the IJ’s factual findings. Instead, the BIA has concluded, on de novo review, that the facts, as found by the IJ, do not meet the legal standard of an objectively reasonable fear of persecution. That approach is entirely consistent with the applicable regulation, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3). See Jian Hui Shoo, 546 F.3d at 162-63 (concluding that the BIA did not erroneously conduct de novo review of the IJ’s factual findings by making “a legal determination that, while [petitioners’] credible testimony was sufficient to demonstrate a genuine subjective fear of future persecution, more was needed to demonstrate the objective reasonableness of that fear”).
In denying some of the petitioners’ motions, the BIA reasonably found that certain of the newly submitted documents were previously obtainable, see INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 104-05, 108 S.Ct. 904, 99 L.Ed.2d 90 (1988), or declined to review evidence submitted for the first time on appeal absent any argument as to why such evidence merited further consideration on remand, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(iv); see also Matter of Fedorenko, 19 I. N. Dec. 57, 74 (BIA 1984). Regardless, the evidence submitted in support of the petitioners’ motions was largely cumulative of the evidence in the record and not materially distinguishable from the evidence discussed in Jian Hui Shao.
Finally, one petitioner argues that the IJ erred by rejecting her request for an adjournment to submit evidence demonstrating that her relatives had been forcibly sterilized. We find that remand for the BIA to consider petitioner’s argument would be futile because the IJ allowed her to testify on the subject and her relatives were not similarly situated See Shunfu Li 529 F.3d at 150; see also Jian Hui Shao, 546 F.3d at 160-61.
For the foregoing reasons, these petitions for review are DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal that the Court previously granted in these petitions is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in these petitions is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument in these petitions is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b).