No. 1426, Docket 91-7129.United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.Argued May 2, 1991.
Decided July 10, 1991.
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Eugene VanVoorhis, Rochester (Robert J. Sant, VanVoorhis
VanVoorhis, of counsel), for plaintiff-appellant.
Christopher J. Bellotto, Counsel, Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., Washington, D.C. (Ann S. Duross, Asst. General Counsel, Colleen B. Bombardier, Sr. Counsel, Washington, D.C., Michael E. Ferdman, Hiscock Barclay, Buffalo, N.Y., of counsel), for defendant-appellee Federal Deposit Ins. Corp.
Stewart Klein, New York City (Ogden N. Lewis, Davis, Polk
Wardwell, of counsel), for defendant-appellee South Street Seaport Museum.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of New York.
Before OAKES, Chief Judge, WINTER, Circuit Judge, and CONBOY, District Judge.[*]
OAKES, Chief Judge:
[1] This case raises an issue of considerable importance concerning the FDIC’s efforts to salvage the nation’s troubled banking industry. Specifically, we must decide whether an individual interested in purchasing the assets of a failed financial institutionPage 374
may disrupt the efforts of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) to dispose of those assets by litigating the propriety of the FDIC’s actions in federal court. For the reasons set forth below, we answer this question in the negative, and therefore affirm the judgment below.
[2] BACKGROUND
[3] The facts giving rise to this appeal stem from the demise of one of this nation’s most venerable financial institutions, the Seamen’s Bank for Savings (“Seamen’s”). After Seamen’s became unable to meet its financial obligations, the federal Office of Thrift Supervision placed it under receivership, and designated the FDIC to serve as receiver. The FDIC promptly arranged for the Chase Manhattan Bank to assume Seamen’s liabilities, and then sold Seamen’s remaining assets, including an extensive collection of maritime paintings, ship models, books and other prices (the Collection”), to itself in its corporate capacity.
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section 702 of the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. Gosnell and the defendants made cross motions for summary judgment.
[9] In a decision and order dated February 4, 1991, the district court held that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to resolve Gosnell’s claims, and therefore granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants and dismissed the complaint. Specifically, it found that Congress intended to shield the FDIC’s asset distribution decisions from judicial review, and that, even if judicial review were available, the FDIC’s decisions here were not arbitrary and capricious within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. § 706(2), that they were not the product of improper political influence in violation of 12 U.S.C. § 1820(a), and that they did not violate the FPASA. Gosnell then brought this appeal.[10] DISCUSSION[11] 1. FIRREA Claims
[12] Gosnell’s contention that the FDIC exceeded its authority and abused its discretion. as well as his claim that the FDIC failed to administer its affairs fairly and impartially, all draw on principles allegedly derived from FIRREA, a recently-enacted statute setting forth the FDIC’S powers in the restructuring of the banking industry. The district court concluded that Congress, in enacting FIRREA, intended to exempt from judicial review FDIC decisions regarding the disposal of assets under its control. We express no opinion on the validity of the district court’s analysis in this regard. Rather, our reading of FIRREA leads us to another, more basic, reason for dismissing Gosnell’s claims — specifically, that disappointed bidders such as Gosnell lack standing under FIRREA to challenge the FDIC’S assets distribution decisions in federal court.[1]
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we believe that allowing Gosnell to sue based on his status as a disappointed bidder would-be inconsistent with FIRREA’s golf of giving the FDIC broad discretion in disposing of the assets under its control. Under 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(2)(G)(i)(II), the FDIC as receiver may “transfer any asset or liability. . . without any approval, assignment or consent with respect to such transfer,” and under 12 U.S.C. § 1823(d)(3)(A), the FDIC enjoyed this same power when acting in its corporate capacity. Gosnell, while recognizing the broad language these provisions contain, attempts to “glean from the spirit and intent of FIRREA” that the FDIC is obligated to maximize its returns through competitive bidding. Brief for Appellant at 33. Specifically, he notes that, under FIRREA, the Resolution Trust Corporation (the “RTC”) is obligated to establish standards for fair and consistent treatment of bidders, see 12 U.S.C. § 1441(a)(14) (West Supp. 1990), and argues that the FDIC should therefore be controlled by the same requirements as well. In our view, however, the fact that Congress imposed these requirements on the RTC while simultaneously granting the FDIC the broad discretionary powers outlined above cuts against Gosnell’s claim, as it suggests that Congress was aware of the advantages of competitive bidding and consciously decided not to impose this alternative on the FDIC. Accordingly, were we to allow disappointed bidders such as Gosnell to challenge the manner in which the FDIC chooses to dispose of its assets, we would undermine Congress’ intent to allow the FDIC broad discretion in the disposition of its assets Santoni v. FDIC, 677 F.2d 174, 179 (1st Cir. 1982) (pre-FIRREA case); cf. Diercks v. FSLIC, 528 F.2d 916, 916 (7th Cir. 1976) (per curiam) (discussing similarly broad discretion granted to the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation).
[16] In contrast to the wide range of discretion granted the FDIC under FIRREA, those statutes under which courts have granted standing to disappointed bidders all contained specific procedural guidelines protecting the bidders’ rights. For example, in B.K. Instrument, Inc. v. United States, 715 F.2d 713(2d Cir. 1983), we granted standing to a disappointed bidder for a defense contract where the statutes alleged to have been violated were quite “specific in their reference to bidders,” and where Congress had amended one of those statutes to “give prospective finders sufficient information to permit them to bid responsibly.” Id. at 719; see also Choctaw Mfg. Co., Inc. v. United States, 761 F.2d 609, 611-12 (11th Cir. 1985); Kinnett Dairies, Inc. v. Farrow, 580 F.2d 1260, 1265-66 (5th Cir. 1978).[2] In these cases, because the statutes were intended in part to protect the bidder’s rights, it was reasonable to conclude that suits by disappointed bidders were consistent with the statutory scheme. See, e.g., Scanwell Labs, Inc. v. Shaffer, 424 F.2d 859, 864 (D.C.Cir. 1970) (“When the Congress has laid down guidelines to be followed in carrying out its mandate in a specific area, there should be some procedure whereby those who aware injured by the arbitrary or capricious action of a government agency or official in ignoring those procedures can vindicate their very real interests. . . .”). By contrast, where, as here, an administrative statute grants an agency a wide range of discretion, courts have denied standing to persons disappointed with the manner in which the agency conducts its affairs. See Sowell’s Meats and Servs., Inc. v. McSwain, 788 F.2d 226, 229 (4th Cir. 1986) (per curiam) (noting that the grant of broad discretion to an agency “demonstrates a lack of a
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property interest or of any protected right in federal procurement procedures and indicates that judicial review of the award of a contract at the behest of a disappointed bidder is inappropriate”); PRI Pipe Supports v. Tennessee Valley Auth.,
494 F.Supp. 974, 976-77 (N.D.Miss. 1980).[3]
[19] Gosnell’s reliance on the FPASA is not persuasive. The FPASA imposes competitive bidding requirements on government agencies only with regard to “excess” and “surplus” property. Excess property is defined as “any property under the control of any Federal agency which is not required for its needs and the discharge of its responsibilities.” 40 U.S.C. § 472(e) (1988). Surplus property, in turn, is defined as “excess property not required for the needs and the discharge of the responsibilities of all Federal agencies.” Id. § 472(g). Here, the FDIC is responsible for liquidating the assets of failed depository institutions, and the Collection, as one of those assets, is therefore “required for. . . the discharge of [the FDIC’s] responsibilities.” Accordingly, the FDIC’s decisions regarding the disposal of the Collection are not controlled by the FPASA, and Gosnell’s reliance on this statute is unfounded. [20] The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
(7th Cir. 1984), in which the court held that an unsuccessful bidder for the acquisition of a financially troubled savings and loan institution had standing to challenge the authorization of the transfer of the institution to another party. In that case, the agency was required by statute to use prescribed procedures and priorities of consideration to assess the bids. Accordingly, because the plaintiff “was entitled to and did participate in the bid solicitation and authorization proceedings” under the statute, he was a person “deemed or admitted as a party. . . in an agency proceedings” within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. § 551(3), and thus had standing to challenge the agency’s action. Id. at 1308.
not bids to buy goods from the government. This distinction is important, as a primary reason for granting standing to disappointed bidders for government contracts is that “[d]oing business with the Government has become an important part of American economic life” and that “arbitrary deprivation of government contracts on non-discretionary grounds is a serious wrong.” B.K. Instrument, 715 F.2d at 719; see also Choctaw,
761 F.2d at 616. These concerns do not apply where the bids are for government assets, and the livelihood of the bidders is not dependent on the agency’s decision.