XIAOQIN LIU, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., U.S. Attorney General,[*] Respondent.

No. 08-1158-ag.United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
July 17, 2009.

[EDITOR’S NOTE: This case is unpublished as indicated by the issuing court.]
[*] Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 43(c)(2), Attorney General Eric H. Holder Jr. is automatically substituted lor former Attorney General Michael B. Mukasey as respondent in this case.

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED,

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that the petition for review is DENIED.

Gary J. Yerman, New York, NY, for Petitioner.

Gregory G. Katsas, Assistant Attorney General; Aviva L. Poczter, Senior Litigation Counsel; M. Lee Quinn, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.


Petitioner Xiaoqin Liu, a native and citizen of the People’s Republic of China, seeks review of a February 13, 2008 order of the BIA denying her motion to reopen. In re Xiaoqin Liu, No. A77 978 101 (B.I.A. Feb. 13, 2008). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history in this case.

We review the agency’s denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion. Ali v. Gonzales, 448 F.3d 515, 517 (2d Cir. 2006). Where the agency considers relevant evidence of country conditions in evaluating a motion to reopen, we review the agency’s factual findings under the substantial evidence standard. See Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 169 (2d Cir. 2008). We find that the agency did not err in denying Liu’s untimely motion to reopen or in finding her ineligible to file a successive asylum application.

Liu argues that the BIA erred by relying on its precedential decisions to conclude that she failed to demonstrate material changed country conditions sufficient to excuse the time limitation for filing her motion to reopen. However, this argument fails where we have previously reviewed the BIA’s consideration of similar evidence in the context of an untimely motion to reopen and have found no error in its conclusion that such evidence was insufficient to establish material changed country conditions or an objectively reasonable fear of persecution. See id. at 169-72 (noting that “[w]e do not ourselves attempt to resolve conflicts in record evidence, a task largely within the discretion of the agency”); see also Wei Guang Wang v. BIA, 437 F.3d 270, 275 (2d Cir. 2006) (noting that while the BIA must consider evidence such as “the oft-cited Aird affidavit, which [it] is asked to consider time and again[,] . . . it may do so in summary fashion without a reviewing court presuming that it has abused its discretion”).

Liu asserts that the BIA abused its discretion when it found that her failure to authenticate certain documents she submitted diminished their probative value. While it is true that the agency errs when it rejects a document solely based on an individual’s failure to authenticate pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 287.6; see Cao He Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 428 F.3d 391, 403 (2d Cir. 2005), we find no abuse of discretion here, where the BIA also found that the documents were not original and contained no signature or any other indication of its author, particularly where the agency denied Liu’s underlying application for relief based on its determination that she was not credible. See Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 471 F.3d 315, 342 (2d Cir. 2006) (finding that the weight afforded to the applicant’s evidence in immigration proceedings lies largely within the discretion of the agency) Qin Wen Zheng v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 143, 148-49 (2d Cir. 2007) (finding that the BIA’s refusal to credit an unauthenticated document was not error where the rejection of the document was based substantially on legitimate credibility concerns and contrary evidence

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as opposed to being based solely on lack of authentication).

Similarly, the BIA’s determination that Liu was ineligible to file a successive asylum application was not in error. See Yuen Jin v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 143, 156, 158-59 (2d Cir. 2008).

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 34(b).