No. 07-0057-cv.United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
May 30, 2008.
Appeal from a judgment of the District Court for the Northern District of New York (Sharpe, J.).
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGEDAND DECREED that the judgment of the district court beAFFIRMED.
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APPEARING FOR APPELLANT: PHILLIP G. STECK, Cooper Erving Savage LLP, Albany, NY.
APPEARING FOR APPELLEE: ELENA DEFIO KEAN, Towne, Bartkowki DeFio Kean, P.C., Albany, NY.
PRESENT: HON. DENNIS JACOBS, ChiefJudge,HON. ROGER J. MINER, CircuitJudge, HON. THOMAS J. MCAVOY, DistrictJudge.[1]
Robert Whalen appeals from an order of the District Court for the Northern District of New York (Sharpe, J.) granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants-Appellees, the Village of Hoosick Falls and Laura Reynolds (“defendants”). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history, and the issues presented for review.
In this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Whalen asserts that defendants deprived him of due process when his application for benefits for work-related injuries under New York General Municipal Law (“GML”) § 207-c was denied without notice or an opportunity to be heard. The district court ruled that due process did not require a pre-deprivation hearing because Whalen possessed only an expectation of benefits.
A grant of summary judgment is reviewed de novo.E.g., Beth Israel Med. Ctr. v. Horizon Blue Cross Blue Shield of N.J., Inc., 448 F.3d 573, 579 (2d Cir. 2006). “[S]ummary judgment is appropriate where there exists no genuine issue of material fact and, based on the undisputed facts, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Whalen argues that because he satisfies the statutory criteria for GML § 207-c disability benefits, he is entitled to a pre-deprivation hearing. However, there is a threshold matter as to whether Whalen has standing. See Lebron v.Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. (Amtrak), 69 F.3d 650, 659 (2d Cir. 1995) (“[T]he question of standing is not subject to
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waiver . . . : we are required to address the issue even if the court below ha[s] not passed on it, and even if the parties fail to raise the issue before us. The federal courts are under an independent obligation to examine their own jurisdiction. . . .” (internal quotation marks 6 omitted)).
At oral argument (consistent with his briefs), Whalen categorically disclaimed any interest in obtaining GML § 207-c benefits as relief in this litigation. (Whalen is pursuing those benefits via an Article 78 proceeding in New York State court.) According to his brief, what Whalen seeks is “an adjudication of what procedural rights he should have been granted under federal constitutional law.” However, “[u]nder Article III, one does not have standing to challenge a procedural violation without having some concrete interest in the outcome of the proceeding to which the violation pertains. . . .” Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 127 S. Ct. 1994, 2008 n. 3 (2007) (Scalia, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). “The [Supreme] Court expressly has disavowed the argument that a procedural deficiency can satisfy the concrete-injury requirement `without any showing that the procedural violation endangers a concrete interest of the plaintiff (apart from his interest in having the procedure observed).'” Lee v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Res.Sys., 118 F.3d 905, 911 (2d Cir. 1997) (quoting Lujanv. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 573 n. 8 (1992)). Because Whalen disclaims any interest in receiving GML § 207-c benefits in this action, he lacks standing to complain of a procedural deficiency. See Connecticut v.Physicians Health Servs. of Conn., Inc., 287 F.3d 110, 117
n. 8 (2d Cir. 2002) (explaining that under Lujan, a party lacks standing “if the party has no concrete interestin the suit and only has a `public interest in proper administration of the laws'” (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 576) (emphasis added)).
Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, the judgment of the district court is hereby AFFIRMED
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